BPF's "Taking the Profit" - extracting maximum value

The British Property Federation (BPF) is an organisation which represents Landlords.  Therefore it is an organisation which is important to me because it is important to my clients.  It recently launched its "Taking the Profit" campaign.  The target of that campaign is the use of administration particularly in the retail sector as a route to turning a distressed business into a more profitable one with the result that landlords either face shop closures or reduced rental income.  I made one prediction in my blog on New Year's Day and this fight was it.  Thank you to the BPF.
As frequent readers of my blog will know, I have much to say on the insolvency regimes and have blogged many times on the issues facing landlords arising out of administrations and other insolvency regimes as well as the impact of recent case law.  It is good to see the BPF seeking to tackle the issues head on and I cannot argue with the first points the BPF makes that the government has failed to act on tightening up pre-packs and making it easier to complain against Insolvency Practitioners.
However, whilst the BPF is to be praised for raising potential abuse of the insolvency regimes for the benefit of shareholders at the cost of creditors (and particularly landlord creditors) I think that in highlighting certain areas which are, perhaps, most headline grabbing some important areas for review have not received similar attention.  Some of the publicity around this campaign suggests that landlords are the unwitting, weak and undefended party in a war which is being waged against them by a united force of IPs and private investors.  Quite simply, in my experience, this is not the case.  Now it may be that my experience (which I admit is largely at the 'better' end of the retail property market (by better I mean primary and secondary) and involves dealing with the likes of KPMG, PWC, E&Y, BDO, Grant Thornton and others) largely misses out the activities at the tertiary end of the market and perhaps practices at that end are a little more shady.  However, my suspicion is that some landlord practices at that end of the market are not quite 'code compliant'.  Further by failing to identify the real reasons why the current regime unfairly prejudices landlords over and above other creditors risks losing the war.
The bad arguments
1.  It is largely pre-pack administrations where landlords are leant on to agree concessions
This is not the case. A pre-pack is when a deal is agreed and documented (but not signed) before the appointment of administrators.  Some of the administrations where landlords have been pressured to give rent concessions have been pre-packs.  However, most high profile administrations have not been pre-packs yet rent concessions have been sought by the new buyer.  Therefore, the BPF is, in fact and rightly, targeting administrations and not just pre-packs with this campaign.
2.  Administrations are effectively being used to transfer funds from pensioners who have invested in property funds and property companies to private investors buying businesses from administrators and then seeking rent concessions or threatening to close down
Using pensioners in any argument seems to be 'de rigueur' at present.  I think care needs to be exercised in utilising this argument.  Apart from anything else when it comes to unprofitable sites there are arguments that the landlord community carries some of the blame:

• in good times landlords happily agree high rents fully in the knowledge that if trading conditions deteriorate that rent may break the business
• the UK leasing model with relatively long lease lengths, upwards only reviews and full repairing and insuring provisions, whilst providing secure income in the sense of no costs, means that rising service charges add to the burden on tenants increasing the risk of insolvency
• the use of quarterly rents creates cash flow issues for tenants and also creates greater risk for landlords in the light of recent case law
• whilst some landlords have been sympathetic to struggling tenants many others have taken an aggressive route refusing to consider any concessions accusing the tenants of trying to make them pay for a bad business

3.  Landlords are being forced to agree rent reductions
No one is being forced to do anything.  Landlords may not like the threatening manner in which some agents and/or buyers act; saying that unless the rent is reduced a unit will be closed down.  But, at the end of the day, the landlord can call their bluff and refuse to agree the concession.  Landlords are not above being threatening either.  I had one case where a landlord (not institutional) unlawfully re-entered a property through the use of, what can only be described as, thugs because he did not like the possibility of a CVA.  That is far more serious than aggressive posturing in a negotiation.
Landlords are big boys and just as able to use an aggressive negotiating stance.  As advised in a recent blog landlords have quite a good negotiating position albeit limited by the commercial realities affecting each individual property.  In reality landlords are often paying for the fact that they own a property which is not in a prime location and which can no longer command rents at the level originally agreed.  If they could get a better rent then they should refuse the rent concession and get possession.  That is called risk and, without wishing to teach grandmothers how to suck eggs, that risk should have been reflected in the yield when the property was acquired.

The other side of the coin

The BPF is absolutely right to put the issue of administrations on the public agenda.  I think it is important to recognise that there are issues with the system which impact (possibly unfairly) on landlords which should be at the forefront of the campaign:

• the current legal position on payment of rents (especially in the light of the decision in the recent case of the Leisure (Norwich) II Ltd & Others -v- Luminar Lava Ignite Ltd (in administration) & others [2012] EWHC 951 (Ch) gives freedom to tenants not to pay rent and for administrators to trade rent free until the next quarter day.  The Game administration is the biggest example of this.  This flies in the face of the "pay for what you use" approach to insolvency situations and is unique to leases due to a clash between real estate law and insolvency law.
• the moratorium preventing forfeiture without consent - with all other contracts the provider can effectively terminate the contract on insolvency and there is nothing to stop them from doing it.  However termination of the lease can only occur by use of forfeiture which is a form of proceedings.  Due to the moratorium such action requires court approval (or administrator consent).  This exposes the landlord to greater potential future loss than other creditors who, whilst they might lose out on arrears, are not exposed to further losses unless they choose to contract with the administrators or the new business

In my view these are the mischiefs which the BPF should be seeking to undo.  Whilst anti-private equity and pro-pensioner arguments attract good press the reality is that they do not properly encapsulate the issues with a system which, whilst not completely broken, is not working in perfect harmony either.

JJB warns of financial breach - a threat to the CVA model?

JJB warns of financial breach Online Property Week
This was the headline which is sending shivers down the backs of Landlords across the country whether or not JJB is actually a tenant of theirs for a number of reasons.

1. JJB, whilst not a bell weather for the retail sector per se, is a large enough retailer that if it is failing to perform it is indicative of issues in the market generally.
2. JJB, utilised a Creditors Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) to much fanfare in 2009 - one in a line of large retailers to do so.  At the time I considered the reasons why one CVA is successful whereas another is not.  Now that the outcome of that CVA is not looking positive Landlords may be concerned regarding the other CVAs which they approved.

As a real estate restructuring lawyer the potential failure of JJB to turn itself around despite the CVA creates an interesting dimension.  The whole argument of a CVA is that the creditors overall will get a better deal than if the company entered administration or liquidation.  Creditors are asked to forgo a proportion of their debt and/or agree revised payment terms in order for the company to continue trading.

For landlords the deal has always been a difficult one.  In a retail CVA there are always some properties the company wishes to exit and the landlord is forced to decide between accepting a liquidated damages offer or taking its chances in an insolvency.  It seemed that JJB (and others like Focus DIY and Blacks Leisure) had managed to work out the correct level of compensation to pay landlords to get them to agree the CVA.

However, if companies that have been through CVAs begin to fail again a couple of years later landlords are going to be left asking themselves whether the problems facing the company where not really the leases but rather the management or the business itself.  Bearing in mind the cost to landlords of considering the CVA terms one wonders whether some will come to the conclusion that it is just not worth it and refuse to back CVAs in the future.

Only time will tell but for now anyway, all JJB's landlords are not sleeping quite so soundly at present.

Tenant CVAs - what makes them acceptable?

This year has seen a new phenomenon being cemented on to the toolkit of the struggling retailer which, in my opinion, was not anticipated prior to 2009 - the large retailer Creditors Voluntary Arrangement (CVA).

For those not necessarily in the know a CVA is effectively a binding agreement reached between a company and its creditors where the creditors will agree a delayed repayment and/or write-off of debts. The agreement is limited in time (a maximum of 2 years) and is monitored by an independent party. For creditors generally (and most importantly unsecured creditors) the process is preferable over administration or liquidation since in those processes the likelihood is that the unsecured creditors will get little or no p/£ of debt. The attractiveness for secured creditors is that it is cheaper than administration and thus should protect the value of the secured assets within the business whilst they retain their security over them.

The year started off very badly for the CVA when, in February, a CVA proposed by the administrators of the Stylo Group (then owner of the Barratts and Priceless shoe chains) was voted down by its creditors and most vehemently by its landlords. At that point one would have been forgiven for thinking that the view following the Powerhouse decision that CVAs were not appropriate where significant leasehold property interests were involved.

However, since the Stylo CVA proposal was defeated quite the opposite has occurred with successful CVAs being agreed on a number of large retailers including JJB Sports and Focus DIY. The latest instalment is a vote today by the creditors of Blacks Leisure on its CVA proposal. It is anticipated that it will be successful (see FT.com article).

The question is what is different about the post-Stylo CVA proposals that have made them successful where Stylo failed? Is it that the market has changed? Is it that Stylo simply broke a taboo and after venting their anger at Stylo landlords have since been more agreeable?

The answer is most likely a mixture but when you look at the detail of the proposals there is a fundamental difference between the unsuccessful Stylo proposal and the other successful proposals. That difference is money and control.

In Stylo every single landlord would have lost out as the proposal involved changing all rents to a turnover rent initially at 3% increasing to 7% (very low levels compared to normal turnover rents) and without a floor. Landlords were invited to seek to obtain better deals in the market and if successful Stylo could either match the deal or surrender their lease. The good news on the Stylo deal was that there was no landlord immediately facing a closed store with irrecoverable cost. The bad news was that the income landlords would obtain was totally dependent on the performance of the tenant. For stores with little or no likelihood of re letting in the medium to long term this was probably okay as at least void costs were avoided. But for landlords of stores that were in good areas the reduction in rent was unacceptable.

Moreover, Stylo was not guaranteeing that every store would then be safe as it sought an ability to surrender those stores it chose during the life of the CVA. There was to be no compensation to landlords for taking back their stores and no protection from void costs. It is probably this exposure that was the ultimate issue for landlords.

Compare that to the successful CVAs which have some or all of the following features:

• No additional store closures over and above those that had already closed (i.e. landlords knew if their site was closed)
• No rent reductions although movement to monthly rent payments
• On closed stores the tenant would continue to pay the rates (landlords were protected from this oppressive liability)
• A pot of money (normally equal to 6 months' rent) was distributed between the landlords of closed stores as compensation

The difference is huge. On the successful CVAs Landlords knew where they stood immediately. Closed store landlords knew that in an administration they would get nothing whereas in the CVA they would get compensation and be protected from void rates whilst the lease subsisted. Open store landlords were asked for concessions which they would probably have given without a CVA.

What the above highlights more than anything else is that timing matters. Clearly, for Stylo to have proposed a CVA along the lines of the successful proposals it would have required significantly more cash to cover the large expenses. This would have meant a CVA being proposed a lot earlier than it was. In the end the timing was wrong. To have a successful CVA you need to have sufficient funds to "buy off" the worst off creditors (i.e. landlords of closing stores). This requires the directors to be brave enough to recognise the issues and see the potential for a better result for creditors and stakeholders alike by taking early pre-emptive action when the company can afford it.

Whether the successful CVAs will actually result in successful companies in the future only time will tell but, at least for the landlords, the CVA was a less bitter pill in the short term.